Four Deaths One Tale – Analyzing the Deaths of Three Israeli Captives

You’ve likely heard about the event on Friday in which Israeli soldiers shot and killed three Israeli captives who had either fled from their captors or been abandoned by them during fighting in the Shejaiya neighborhood of Gaza City. The three were two Israeli Jews and one Israeli Bedouin, each of whom had been taken on October 7th. At the simplest level, this mirrors “friendly fire” in which soldiers unintentionally kill fellow soldiers from their own army during wartime. In this case, it’s hostages not fellow soldiers. But the nature of the case is similar.

The event has sparked controversy within Israel, both due to the inherently tragic nature of the captives’ deaths and because of the specific details of how they died. Their deaths have reignited debates and protests about how the government is balancing the need to dismantle Hamas and bring the country’s captives home safely. Recent weeks have seen various protests in Israel, often led by or featuring families of captives, demanding the government to focus more on reaching a deal with Hamas to bring back all the captives. The controversy has been fueled in part by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s nearly complete refusal to visit and meet with residents of communities attacked on October 7th or the families of the captives.

I want to provide more detail about how this occurred and tie that in with the tale of another shooting that occurred in Jerusalem on November 30th, involving Yuval Castleman.

On November 30th, Castleman, a lawyer and former police officer on his way to work, encountered a terrorist attack unfolding at a Jerusalem bus stop. Two assailants had already killed three civilians on their morning commute. (Hamas later claimed responsibility for the attack.) Castleman got out of his car with his gun, charged toward the scene and shot and killed the two attackers, essentially putting an end to the attack. As this unfolded, two soldiers arrived. Another man, subsequently identified as off-duty reservist Aviad Frija, also approached Castleman. The three mistook Castleman for one of the assailants.

Up to this point, there is tragic confusion. Castleman realized that the soldiers thought he was one of the attackers and proceeded to discard his gun. He opened his shirt (to show he had no additional weapons or a suicide vest) and raised his hands in the air while shouting in Hebrew “don’t shoot” and that he was an Israeli. At some point in these tense moments, he threw his wallet with his ID toward the soldiers to identify himself. The off-duty reservist, Frija, shot Castleman multiple times and left him bleeding on the ground.

Castleman passed away hours later in the hospital.

While the true circumstances of the incident were still unclear, Frija was briefly hailed as a hero for killing the suspected terrorist and cheered by right-wing politicians. He proudly mentioned in interviews that he was part of the “hilltop youth,” groups of radical teens and young men in the West Bank who act as squatters on land for new illegal outposts and as vigilantes attacking Palestinians and their property.

Castleman’s final moments are as complex as his tragic death, bundling together multiple stories in one chaotic flurry. On one level, it’s friendly fire and mistaken identity. Frija thought he was killing a Hamas terrorist who had already shot and/or killed several Israeli civilians. But IDF rules of engagement make it clear he shouldn’t have shot Castleman even if he was a terrorist. Castleman threw down his gun, opened his jacket to show he had no suicide vest or other weapons, and knelt. Castleman’s family rightfully called the shooting an “execution.”

In a story reminiscent of police shootings in the United States, Frija initially claimed that Castleman had made suspicious movements that made him fear for his life. However, subsequently released surveillance video of the incident disproved these claims. (Frija is currently under house arrest while being investigated for reckless homicide.)

Following Castleman’s death, former IDF chief of staff and one-time Netanyahu ally Moshe Ya’alon stated that Itamar Ben Gvir’s “populist” calls to loosen open-fire regulations had contributed to the environment that made Castleman’s death possible. Ya’alon pointed to a similar incident in 2016. It was quite similar to Castleman’s except for the fact that the injured and unarmed man on the ground genuinely was a terrorist. IDF soldier Elor Azaria shot him. He was later tried and convicted for manslaughter. But he became a hero on the Israeli right for his actions.

Let’s return to the killing of the three Israeli captives in Gaza City.

It’s important to understand that this takes place in the chaos of urban warfare. Hamas fighters’ only chance to engage Israeli soldiers on favorable terms is through deceit and ambushes. The IDF has reported that Hamas fighters have used recordings of babies and people crying for help in Hebrew to lure in soldiers. But even in this context, the details of the killings are at best troubling.

While the incident is still being investigated, initial reports indicate that the three men, without shirts, appeared waving a white flag. An Israeli soldier in a nearby building opened fire and shouted “terrorists!” This initial volley killed two of the captives. The third, apparently injured, retreated into a building from which he could be heard crying for help in Hebrew. At this point, the battalion commander left the building and called on his soldiers to stop shooting. Moments later the third captive came out of the building again and another soldier opened fire, killing him.

None of us who haven’t been in that kind of situation can likely imagine the level of terror experienced by soldiers tasked with clearing out terrorist fighters, knowing those fighters are lying in wait to catch them off guard or lure them into ambushes. But that’s precisely what military training and clear rules of engagement are meant to handle. In this case, it certainly appears to have failed, though we should wait for the results of the full investigation before making any final judgments.

These are two different incidents in very different circumstances. We should be cautious about drawing too strong conclusions since each incident revolves around individual factors, some of which we may not yet know. But both suggest that clear military rules of engagement are frequently ignored and that Palestinians, whether surrendering terrorists or innocents, are killed contrary to prohibitions against opening fire on unarmed or surrendering people. We’re hearing about these incidents precisely because the victims were Israelis.

One clear fact of history and military life is that occupations degrade militaries, both morally and operationally. There’s no question that this has happened with the IDF, after half a century of occupation. The ongoing settlement process has both entrenched the occupation while also breeding a community of violent extremists who have themselves entered the IDF in growing numbers and altered it. Notably, the far-right minister I mentioned above, Itamar Ben Gvir, was rejected by the IDF, despite the fact that there is universal conscription, because of his far-right-activism during his youth. He first became notorious as a teenager in November 1995 when he stole the emblem from then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s official car, boasting, “just like we got to this emblem, we can get to Rabin.” Weeks later, Rabin was murdered by fellow extremist Yigal Amir. Ben Gvir has subsequently been convicted of various offenses, like incitement to racism, supporting a terrorist organization, and vandalism. The list is extensive. When activists tried to sue to prevent him from becoming a minister earlier this year, he insisted he’d mellowed.

Frija, meanwhile, was inducted into a special unit created only a few years ago designated specifically for members of the “hilltop youth.” The IDF is considering disbanding the unit. Unsurprisingly, it has become notorious for some of the worst IDF abuses in the West Bank.

As I mentioned, occupation degrades militaries, morally, operationally. It also degrades societies. The world changed so much on October 7th, certainly in Israel, that it’s easy to forget the country had been awash in massive civilian protests for nearly a year over the government’s attempted judicial coup. The leaders of those protests worked hard to keep the protests focused on the threat the government posed toward Israeli democracy rather than other issues like the occupation, as that is profoundly divisive and would shatter the coalition that sustained the protests. But anyone with eyes open could see that the occupation and the settler extremists it spawned can’t be separated from the threats to democracy within Israel. One sustains the other; one requires the other.

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